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Abstract.  The introduction of contactless payment cards into the global EMV 
payment system introduces a potential vulnerability, in that non-authorised de-
vices can interact with the card, even when still in the cardholder’s wallet.  This 
paper presents a solution addressing this issue, in which the card prevents mali-
cious access to its sensitive data and functionality.  The card issues an authenti-
cation request which the Point of Sale (POS) terminal must sign with its bank 
issued private key, before the card will divulge any sensitive information.  The 
proposed solution uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography, a combination of ECQV 
implicit certificates and ECDSA signatures, which provide both cryptographic 
strength and efficient use of the limited message size in EMV.  There are 23.8 
million EMV POS terminals installed globally; the design therefore focuses on 
integrating POS authentication without altering the EMV protocol.  Finally, the 
paper presents an innovative solution for revocation of the POS terminal keys. 
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1 Introduction 
Researchers have demonstrated that NFC
1
-enabled mobile phones and off-the-shelf 
NFC readers can be used for skimming attacks [5], eavesdropping attacks [7], access 
the card’s secure functionality [6] and to make fraudulent transactions [7].  These 
attacks are possible because the cards will communicate with any device equipped 
with an NFC reader that comes within range, even without the cardholder’s knowl-
edge.  To address this vulnerability, this paper presents a POS terminal authentication 
solution for EMV contactless payment cards.  Terminal authentication allows contact-
                                                          
1  Contactless POS terminals use Near Field Communication (NFC) to communicate with 
contactless payments cards 
less card to distinguish genuine POS terminals from other NFC readers and thereby 
restrict access to its sensitive data and secure application functionality. 
Our solution combines several existing technologies in an innovative way to solve 
the complex issues related to adding functionality to a global payment system such as 
EMV.  The contribution of the solution is outlined below. 
 
POS Authentication process.  Any NFC reader attempting to access the card will be 
challenged by the card to authenticate itself as a genuine bank-issued POS terminal.  
The card sends an unpredictable number (nonce) to the POS terminal, and the termi-
nal must authenticate itself by producing an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algo-
rithm (ECDSA) signature based on this nonce challenge.  The card is able to validate 
the ECDSA signature (Fig. 3) using a three-tier Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based 
on the Certificate Authority public key that is stored on the card (Fig. 4). 
 
Restricting access to the card’s sensitive data / secure functionality.  The card will 
restrict access to sensitive data and secure functionality until POS authentication has 
taken place.  This is achieved using a state machine similar to that currently imple-
mented by MasterCard [15].  The state machine will control the sequence in which 
EMV commands can be called, and thereby the data that can be accessed (described 
in Section 2.4). 
 
Integration with the EMV protocol sequence.  There are four EMV contactless 
protocol command sequences, one each for Visa, MasterCard, American Express and 
JCB.  The POS authentication functionality has been designed so that it can be incor-
porated into all four protocol sequences without changing the command sequence.  To 
achieve this, the solution adds new data fields (Table 2) to the two commands that 
occur at the start of all four protocol sequences: Select() and GetProcessin-
gOptions().  Fig. 1 shows how the POS authentication functionality is incorpo-
rated into the Visa protocol sequence.  Further details can be found in Section 5.2. 
 
Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography.  The EMV protocol has a restricted message 
size of 256 bytes.  This does not cause problems in the existing RSA authentication of 
the card by the POS terminal, as the card can pass several 256-byte messages in re-
sponse to a single POS terminal message.  However this does cause a problem in the 
proposed POS authentication solution as the POS terminal must pass all of authentica-
tion information in a single 256-byte message.  The solution for this problem is to use 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which provides increased cryptographic strength 
over the existing RSA scheme [4][16] whilst allowing the authentication information 
to be passed in a single message.  The ECC curve and algorithms used in the solution 
are as per EMV’s 2007 proposal document regarding the use of ECC [12]. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 outlines our proposed solution 
in detail; it illustrates how POS authentication and ECC (which are the key building 
blocks of our solution) can be integrated into the EMV protocol.  Section 3 provides 
an overview a fully implemented prototype to demonstrate the feasibility of the solu-
tion.  Test results from the prototype are given in Section 4.  Section 5 discusses the 
challenges involved in implementing the POS terminal authentication protocol.  Each 
challenge is followed by an explanation on how our proposed solution addresses the 
issues.  Finally, Section 6 concludes our paper, and Section 7 outlines potential im-
provement and other issues that still need to be addressed in our future work.   
2 Outline of Proposed Solution  
The Chip & PIN technology on EMV payment cards have been proven relatively 
secure against card fraud since the introduction of Dynamic Data Authentication 
(DDA) cards in 2009.  Contactless payment technology adds a wireless interface to 
EMV cards, which allows it to be accessed whilst it is still the cardholder’s pocket, 
even without their knowledge.   
In the current EMV payment system the cards must prove to POS terminals that 
they are genuine, the reverse is not true.  NFC enabled devices such as smart phones 
are becoming more common, these can mimic POS terminal’s behaviour, the lack of 
terminal authentication could lead to cases where rogue terminals might carry out 
skimming and eavesdropping attacks, even leading to fraudulent transactions. 
Our solution aims to address this imbalance by making it necessary for any NFC 
enabled device attempting to access the card to authenticate itself.  In other words, our 
solution will prevent the card from revealing sensitive information, unless the NFC 
reader can prove it is a genuine POS terminal issued by a bank. 
2.1 Transaction Protocol 
There are four variations of the EMV contactless transaction protocol sequence, one 
each for Visa, MasterCard, American Express and JCB cards.  The prototype imple-
ments Visa’s Fast Dynamic Data Authentication (fDDA) contactless transaction pro-
tocol sequence (Fig. 1).  Visa fDDA was selected as it contains the least number of 
commands of any of the four protocol sequences, and thereby it provides the most 
stringent constraints regarding which commands can be modified to incorporate the 
POS authentication functionality. 
In Fig. 1, the new elements of the protocol sequence required for POS authentica-
tion are marked in blue.  POS authentication uses the Select() command (Fig. 1 
point 6.0) and the GetProcessingOptions() command (Fig. 1 point 8.0), since 
these command are common to all four contactless protocols.  Select() and Get-
ProcessingOptions() are also the first two commands in each of the protocol 
sequences which allow the protocol sequence to be halted before any sensitive data is 
divulged by the card.   
The request for POS authentication has been added to the PDOL returned by the 
Select() command  (Fig. 1 point 6.3).  Details of the new structure of the PDOL 
are given in Section 2.2.  The PDOL was chosen as the trigger for POS authentication 
as it is currently the way that the card requests information from the POS terminal. 
CardTerminal
1.0 InitiateTransaction()
3.0 PresentCardToTerminal()
4.0 ListAvailableNFCApplications()
4.1 List of available applications
6.0 SelectApplication(AID)
6.3 Card data, PDOL list and Nonce
4.2 Command Error
6.4 Command Error
8.0 GetProcessingOptions(PDOL data, 
signed nonce, public key certificates)
8.9 Transaction Approved - TC + SDAD + 
plaintext SDAD + AC + AFL
8.10 Transaction Must Go Online -ARQC
8.12 Command Error
8.11 Transaction Declined - AAC
9.0 ReadAFLRecord(SFI, Record)
9.1 AFL record
[ for each AFL SFI / record ]
11.0 RemoveCard()
Loop
8.3 GenerateUPN()
8.4 GenerateSDAD()
8.5 GenerateAC()
8.6 UpdateTransactionCount()
8.7 DecrementNFCCount()
8.8 UpdateAvailableOffline()
10.0 ValidateTransaction()
Validating the transaction 
also authenticates the card
7.1 PopulatePDOL()
Including signature and 
terminal public key 
certificates
2.0 WaitForCard()
5.0 ChooseAID()
5.1 SelectTheKernel(AID)
6.1 GenerateNonce()
6.2 Request new fields in PDOL
8.1 ValidatePOSSignature()
Using CA public key and 
terminal public keys 
8.2 On error return “Other Interface”
7.0 GenerateSignature()
 
Fig. 1.  Prototype POS authentication transaction protocol sequence. 
The nonce is also contained in the response to the Select() command (Fig. 1 
point 6.3).  The nonce is an 8-byte unpredictable number which the POS terminal 
must sign with its private key to produce the ECDSA authentication signature (Fig. 3 
- ECDSA Signed Nonce).  A nonce is used to ensure that the ECDSA signature can-
not be recorded by an attacker and replayed to gain access to the card. 
The POS terminal generates the ECDSA authentication signature (Fig. 1 point 7.0), 
which is then returned in the message data contained in the GetProcessingOp-
tions() command (Fig. 1 point 8.0).  The message also contains the Elliptic Curve 
Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) implicit certificates and other data required by the card to vali-
date the ECDSA signature. 
If POS authentication fails, the card returns “Try Another Interface” (Fig. 1 point 
8.2) which will cause the POS terminal to request a Chip & PIN contact transaction.  
This has the advantage that it ensures that the transaction is not lost if the POS termi-
nal is not compatible with POS authentication.  POS terminals which have not been 
updated to include POS authentication will follow the existing EMV protocol and 
continue the transaction in Chip & PIN mode [10]. 
2.2 Processing options Data Object List (PDOL) 
The PDOL is a list of data fields that the card requests from the POS terminal.  For 
POS authentication, the PDOL must contain all of the standard transaction fields 
(Table 1).  In addition, it must also contain the new fields required for POS authenti-
cation (Table 2). 
Table 1.  Transaction data fields in the current Visa PDOL 
TAG Length Description 
9F66 4 bytes Terminal Transaction Qualifiers (Visa specific; this tag will 
need be changed for each of the different issuer card types) 
9F02 6 bytes Transaction amount 
9F03 6 bytes Amount other (used for cashback always zero) 
9F1A 2 bytes Terminal country code 
95 5 bytes Terminal verification results (always zero at this stage) 
5F2A 2 bytes Transaction currency code 
9A 3 bytes Transaction date 
9C 1 bytes Transaction type (always 00 for purchase) 
9F37 4 bytes POS terminal nonce 
Table 2.  Fields required for POS authentication 
TAG Length Description 
9F81 64 bytes  ECDSA signed nonce (see Fig. 3) 
9F82 64 bytes  Acquirer implicit certificate (see Fig. 3 - Aic) 
9F83 9 bytes  Acquirer ID data (see Table 3) 
9F84 64 bytes  Terminal implicit certificate (see Fig. 3 - Tic) 
9F85 9 bytes  Terminal ID data ( Table 3) 
2.3 Acquirer ID (Aid) and Terminal ID (Tid) information 
The Aid and Tid contain the plaintext data which is used to calculate the ECQV Ac-
quirer implicit certificate (Aic) and Terminal implicit certificate (Tic).  Details of the 
data contained in Aid and Tid are given in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Acquirer and Terminal ID information 
Field Length Data 
ID number 4 bytes Identity of the acquirer (Fig. 3 – Aid)  
Identity of the terminal (Fig. 3 – Tid) 
Expiry Date 2 bytes MMYY 
Serial Number 3 bytes Version number of implicit certificate 
Total 9 bytes  
 
The format of the Aid and Tid data has been designed to follow the issuer informa-
tion contained in the current EMV RSA public key certificates [11] (i.e. 4-byte issuer 
ID, 2-byte expiry date, and 3-byte serial number). 
2.4 Controlling access to the card’s data and functionality 
The cards will require a state ma-
chine similar to that currently im-
plemented by MasterCard (Fig. 2).   
The MasterCard state machine is 
relevant to the proposed solution in 
that the two major control points 
used there are the Select() and 
GetProcessingOptions() 
commands. 
When the card is “IDLE”, Se-
lect() is the only command that 
can be called.  Successful comple-
tion of Select() places the card 
into the “SELECTED” state.   
Being in the “SELECTED” state 
allows access to GetProces-
singOptions() which puts the 
card into the “INITIATED” state.  
In turn, this state gives full access 
to the card. 
In order to make our proposed 
solution work, there is a need to 
alter the existing state machine,  
 
Fig. 2.  MasterCard state machine (source [15]) 
whereby the ReadRecord() command is moved to after the “INITIATED” state, 
which prevents the card’s sensitive information from being read prior to POS authen-
tication being completed. 
2.5 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
A 512-bit ECC scheme has been selected for the proposed solution as it provides a 
higher cryptographic bit-strength than EMV’s current 1984-bit RSA scheme.  The 
shorter ECC scheme also allows the extra data required for POS authentication to fit 
into the GetProcessingOptions() PDOL message. 
The solution utilises two elliptic curve schemes, ECQV and ECDSA, which per-
form different tasks in the implementation.  The CA pubic key stored on the card and 
the two ECQV implicit certificates supplied by the POS terminal form a three-tier 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is used to verify the ECDSA digital signature 
generated by the POS terminal (Fig. 3).  Brown et al., 2011 [3] describes a scheme for 
ECQV-certified ECDSA such as the one implemented in the prototype. 
With ECQV implicit certificates, the CA public key is used to generate a public 
key from the implicit certificate, which in turn is used to generate the public key from 
the implicit certificate on the subsequent tier of the PKI [2]. 
2.6 Elliptic Curve POS Authentication Process 
CardTerminal
Acquirer ECQV implicit certificate (Aic)
CA public key index (CAind)
CA public key (CApk)
Random Nonce
Compute the ECDSA 
signature of the Nonce
Terminal ECQV implicit certificate (Tic)
Terminal private key (Tsk)
Card computes the Acquirer public key
Select Terminal private 
key that matches the CA 
public key of the card
ECDSA Signed Nonce
Acquirer identification data (Aid)
Terminal identification data (Tid)
Acquirer Public Key (Apk)
Card computes the Terminal public key
Terminal Public Key (Tpk)
Card validates the  signature of the Nonce
Signature Authenticated
 
Fig. 3.  POS Authentication by Card 
The POS terminal authenticates itself by creating an ECDSA signature of the nonce 
produced by the card (see Fig. 3) using its private key (Tsk).  The card validates the 
ECDSA signature using the CA public key (CApk) and the two ECQV implicit cer-
tificates: the Acquirer (Aic) and Terminal (Tic).  The card generates the Acquirer 
public key (Apk) and Terminal public key (Tpk) from the ECQV implicit certificates 
(Aic) and (Tic).  The card authenticates ECDSA signature using the Acquirer public 
key (Apk) and Terminal public key (Tpk) and the card’s copy of the nonce produced 
by the card. 
The solution depends on the POS terminal signing a nonce generated by the card; 
the nonce ensures that the ECDSA signature is fresh each time the card requests au-
thentication.  The three-tier Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) links the ECDSA signa-
ture produced by the POS to the CA public key (CApk), which proves that the Termi-
nal’s private key was issued by an authorised Acquirer bank. 
The POS terminals keys will be stored on the Secure Access Module  (SAM), the 
SAM protects the keys from being read by brute force.  The SAM also allows addi-
tional cryptographic functionality to be added to the POS without requiring an up-
grade.  Distributing the keys on the SAM avoids transmitting the keys to the POS 
terminal and thereby risking interception. 
2.7 Elliptic Curve Generation of POS Terminal Keys  
To perform the POS authentication process detailed in Fig. 1, the POS terminal must 
have two ECQV implicit certificates: the Acquirer implicit certificate (Aic) and the 
Terminal implicit certificate (Tic), as well as a Terminal private key (Tsk).  These are 
generated in the process detailed in Fig. 4. 
Certificate AuthorityTerminal Acquiring Bank
Acquirer ECQV implicit certificate (Aic)
CA public key index (CAind)
CA public key (CApk)
CA computes(G,r1,Aid) to 
create Implicit Certificate 
CA private key (CAsk)
Acquirer private key (Ask)
Acquirer identification data (Aid)
Random number (r1)
CA sends Issuer 
private key 
reconstruction data
Acquirer computes(G,r2,Tid) 
to create Implicit Certificate
Terminal ECQV implicit certificate (Tic)
Terminal identification data (Tid)
Acquirer computes  their own private key
Random number (r2)
Elliptic curve base point (G)
Terminal private key (Tsk)
Acquirer computes 
Terminal private key 
reconstruction data 
 
Fig. 4.  Generation of POS Terminal Keys 
Fig. 4 shows that the Acquirer implicit certificate (Aic) and Acquirer private key 
(Ask) are generated by the Certificate Authority based on the data supplied by the 
Acquiring bank.  The Acquiring bank generates the Terminal implicit certificate (Tic) 
and Terminal private key (Tsk) using the Acquirer keys (Aic) and (Ask). 
The Certificate Authority, Acquirer and Terminal keys form a three-tier Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) that enables the card to validate the ECDSA digital signature 
produced by the POS terminal based on the Certificate Authority public key (CApk) 
stored on the card. 
In the current EMV PKI, there is a CApk for each of the four card issuers (Visa, 
MasterCard, American Express and JCB).  The POS terminal will have to store a set 
of keys (CApk, Aic, Tic and Tsk) for each card issuer that the POS terminal wants to 
accept. 
2.8 Elliptic Curve Card authentication 
Based on the current EMV specification, the card authenticates itself by producing an 
RSA signature of the transaction data, referred to as the Signed Dynamic Application 
Data (SDAD) (Fig. 1 – points 8.4 and 8.9).  The POS terminal validates the SDAD 
RSA signature and thereby the card (Fig. 1 – point 10).  In the proposed solution, the 
SDAD has been altered to be an ECDSA signature rather than RSA.  This alteration 
means that all of the cryptography used in the proposed solution is based on elliptic 
curve. 
3 Prototype implementation 
The prototype implementation consists of a prototype POS terminal and a prototype 
payment device.  The payment device is a mobile phone emulation of a Visa contact-
less card which incorporates the POS authentication functionality. 
3.1 Prototype payment device 
The payment device has been implemented as a card emulation on a Nexus S Android 
mobile phone.  Implementation on Java Card would have been preferred, however 
this was not practical since Java Card does not support ECQV natively using the 
card’s cryptographic co-processor.  The current version of Java Card 2.2.2 does sup-
port ECDSA and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) natively [17], it is therefore 
assumed that EMV payment cards could support ECQV in the future if the demand 
from the banks was great enough. 
The Nexus S Android mobile phone was selected for prototype development as it 
provides both contactless (NFC) communication and the functionality required to 
generate the ECQV public key certificates and verify the ECDSA signature. 
 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography.  The ECQV and ECDSA cryptography software for 
the Android mobile phone platform has been implemented from scratch as the An-
droid SDK does not natively support ECQV implicit certificates.  This required the 
implementation of the methods for elliptic curve point addition and multiplication. 
To ensure compatibility with future implementations of EMV, the prototype uses 
the NIST elliptic curve P-256 defined by EMV in their ECC proposal document [12]. 
For consistency the payment device application also uses ECDSA to generate the 
SDAD signature, which the POS terminal uses to authenticate the card. 
3.2 Prototype POS terminal 
The prototype POS terminal is implemented on a PC with an ACR-122U contactless 
reader.  The POS terminal implements the Visa fDDA protocol sequence outlined in 
Fig. 1 with some additional data fields (Table 2).  The Visa fDDA protocol was cho-
sen because it is the shortest (i.e.  it has the most stringent requirements regarding 
size) of the contactless protocol sequences and thereby demonstrates that the proto-
type can be implemented in any of the other contactless protocol sequences (i.e.  
MasterCard, American Express or JCB). 
The prototype POS terminal implements the Visa fDDA transaction protocol se-
quence as defined in the EMV Contactless Specification Book C-3 [16].  Should POS 
authentication fail, the prototype payment device (Android phone) will return a “Try 
Another Interface” as the transaction outcome (see Book C-3 [16] Section 5.2.2.2).  
This will cause the POS terminal to initiate Chip & PIN completion of the transaction. 
 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography.  The prototype POS terminal implements ECQV and 
ECDSA cryptographic functionality required to generate the ECDSA POS authentica-
tion signature and verify the SDAD ECDSA signature produced by the prototype 
payments device. 
4 Prototype test results 
We have carried out initial experiments of running the prototype solution using a 
Nexus S Android mobile phone as a card emulation.  For now, we have to use this 
emulation method because the current Java Card 2.2.2 does not support ECQV.  
However, it is envisaged that the ECDSA signature verification process will be faster 
when ECQV support is available on payment cards’ cryptographic co-processor.  The 
protocol sequence timing is given here to illustrate the feasibility of the solution; fu-
ture work on improving the performance will be carried out, as outlined in Section 7.   
4.1 Prototype transaction timings 
Table 4 shows the average time to complete each stage of the transaction protocol 
when the prototype implementation is run on a Nexus S Android mobile phone.  Sig-
nificantly, we see an average of 3.6 seconds for the phone to generate the ECQV pub-
lic keys and validate the ECDSA signature.   
 
Table 4.  Protyptype Transaction Timings 
Protocol Sequence Activity  Avg (ms)  Stdev(ms) 
Transaction initialisation  (Fig. 1 - 3.0 to 6.3) 198.8 25.5 
ECDSA signature generation  (Fig. 1 – 7.0) 89.0 45.1 
PDOL Generation  (Fig. 1 – 7.1) 29.7 27.1 
Signature Verification + SDAD (Fig. 1 – 8.1 to 8.9) 3622.7 67.7 
Signature Verification  (Fig. 1 – 8.1 + 8.2) 2172.0 58.2 
SDAD generation (Fig. 1 – 8.3 to 8.9) 1450.7 (calculated) 
Read Card Data  (Fig. 1 – 9.0 to 9.1) 237.5 2.1 
ECC SDAD verification  (Fig. 1 – 10.0) 95.0 6.4 
Average Transaction Time  4265.9  
 
The prototype takes 2.172 seconds to verify the POS authentication ECDSA signature 
(Fig. 1, points 8.1 and 8.2) and 1.4507 seconds to generate the SDAD ECDSA signa-
ture (Fig. 1, points 8.3 to 8.9).  Cryptography operations represent 85% of the total 
transaction time. 
The total transaction time of 4.2659 seconds is slow when compared to a typical 
Visa contactless transaction which takes approximately 1 second.  However the proto-
type performs the cryptography in the Java application rather than on a dedicated 
cryptographic co-processor such as the one available on EMV cards.  Future work 
will compare the time for the prototype to perform ECDSA generation and verifica-
tion with the time taken by a Java Card with cryptographic co-processor. We will also 
examine the possibility of speeding up the ECDSA signature verification process, for 
example using the technique outlined by Antipa et al., 2005 [1], which claims to 
speed up the process by 40%. 
4.2 Prototype payment device log file 
Verifying the POS authentication ECDSA signature requires a number of calculations 
to (i) derive the issuer public key from the EQCV implicit certificate; (ii) derive the 
terminal public key from the EQCV implicit certificate; (iii) calculate the ECDSA 
POS authentication signature; (iv) compare the calculated ECDSA signature with the 
POS authentication sent by the POS terminal. 
An extract of the Android payment device log file has been included in Appendix 1 
showing the step-by-step verification of the ECDSA signature.  This information is 
included for the benefit of readers who are familiar with ECC and would like to see 
the detailed steps involved. 
5 Challenges 
The solution is designed to prevent attacks on contactless cards using devices with 
NFC readers, such as mobile phones.  During the process of designing the solution, 
the following challenges and possible modes of attack on the solution were identified 
and solved. 
5.1 Integration with the existing EMV infrastructure  
Challenge.  Globally there are 23.8 million EMV POS terminals and 1.6 billion EMV 
credit / debit cards [13].  Therefore any change to the EMV protocol has a major fi-
nancial impact across many organisations.  It is therefore essential that any change to 
EMV can be implemented as a gradual replacement program rather than an enforced 
step change.  This requires that cards and POS terminals which implement the new 
functionality must be capable of running in parallel with existing cards and POS ter-
minals for many years. 
 
Solution.  The POS authentication solution was designed to deal with the two scenar-
ios without the loss of the transaction or the customer having to use a different card: 
(i) an existing card making a payment at a POS terminal with the new functionality; 
(ii) a card with the new functionality making a payment at an existing POS terminal.  
Note: the other two potential scenarios (existing card – existing POS terminal and 
new card – new POS terminal) do not have any issue here. 
In the first scenario, the new POS terminal will perform the existing EMV contact-
less protocol which is appropriate for the type of the card (Visa, MasterCard, Ameri-
can Express or JCB). 
In the second scenario the card will request POS authentication.  It does this by re-
questing specific data fields in the PDOL as described in Section 2.2.  An existing 
POS terminal will not be able to supply the fields required (Table 2) and will there-
fore exit the transaction with transaction outcome of “Try Another Interface” [10].  In 
all of the contactless protocols, the outcome of “Try Another Interface” causes the 
POS terminal to request that the transaction is completed in Chip & PIN mode.  This 
allows the transaction to continue with minimum interruption. 
5.2 Integration with existing EMV contactless protocol sequence 
Challenge.  As stated in Section 5.1 the cost of any change to EMV is very large.  
The POS authentication process must therefore be incorporated into the existing con-
tactless protocols without changing the command sequence. 
 
Solution.  The solution is integrated into the Select() and GetProcessingOp-
tions() commands which are the first two commands in all four contactless proto-
col sequences.  In the Select() command, the card requests the fields required for 
POS authentication (Table 2).  In GetProcessingOptions(), the POS terminal 
returns the ECDSA signature that authenticates it as genuine. 
The solution takes advantage of EMV’s existing Data Object List functionality, 
which allows the card to request a flexible list of data fields from the POS terminal.  
In other words, we are using mechanisms that are already there, without the necessity 
of changing the protocol (Table 3). 
To perform POS authentication, it is necessary to return a digital signature and two 
key certificates in a single 256-byte GetProcessingOptions() message.  This 
is not possible under the current EMV scheme (1984-bit RSA).  The solution imple-
ments a 512-bit ECC scheme which is cryptographically stronger than the current 
RSA scheme.  It allows two ECQV implicit certificates and an ECDSA signature to 
form a POS authentication to be sent in a single GetProcessingOptions() 
message. 
5.3 Revocation of POS terminal keys 
Challenge.  The ability to revoke POS terminals keys is an essential part of the de-
sign.  This is because the cards have no way of communicating with the outside world 
apart from through a connection with a terminal.  This creates a situation where a 
single compromised POS terminal could result in every EMV card being potentially 
compromised. 
Consider the following two scenarios: (i) a POS terminal’s private key was com-
promised and used to generate ECDSA signatures; (ii) a genuine POS terminal is 
stolen or misused to generate ECDSA signatures.  In both cases, the ECDSA signa-
tures produced will appear to be genuine to every EMV-compliant contactless card, 
since the card has no means of directly receiving and storing information about re-
voked POS terminal keys. 
Informing every EMV card of the revoked keys is impractical, as the bank’s 
backend servers can only communicate with the card when it is connected to a POS 
terminal or ATM.  In addition, there is insufficient storage on the cards to store the 
revoked keys. 
The keys must therefore be revoked at the POS terminal.  However it is too late for 
the acquiring bank to send a message to tell the POS to revoke its key once the POS 
key is compromised or the POS has been stolen. 
 
Solution.  The proposed solution forces the POS terminal to regularly request a “stay 
alive” authorisation message from the acquiring bank’s backend servers.  The POS 
terminal will only be allowed to issue a limited number of ECDSA signatures (e.g.  
50) before it must request another “stay alive” authorisation.  Limiting the number of 
ECDSA signature produced by a stolen / compromised POS does not entirely prevent 
contactless attacks but it does prevent large scale attacks, as these would produce 
unusually high numbers of POS authorisation requests that could be detected by the 
bank and shut down accordingly. 
The “stay alive” requests would be made in between contactless transactions when 
the POS terminal was inactive thereby not impacting on the speed of a contactless 
transaction. 
To prevent the private keys being read directly from the POS terminal’s storage, 
the proposed solution recommends the storage of the private keys on the SAM which 
is the current method of providing safe key storage for EMV POS terminals (see Sec-
tion 5.4 below). 
5.4 Safe Storage of POS terminal keys 
Challenge.  Given that there is monetary impact associated with the loss of POS ter-
minal keys, it is important to protect them.  There are 23.8 million EMV POS termin-
als in circulation worldwide [13]; you can even buy POS terminals on eBay.  This 
gives criminals easy access POS terminals from which they could attempt to extract 
the POS terminal keys. 
 
Solution.  The POS keys must therefore be stored in secure storage.  Modern POS 
terminals already have secure storage for their cryptographic keys, in the form of the 
Secure Access Module (SAM).  The proposed solution will make use of SAM to store 
the keys required for POS authentication. 
6 Conclusion 
Traditional Chip & PIN transactions have required the cardholder to explicitly author-
ise access to their card by taking it out of their wallet and putting it into the Chip & 
PIN POS terminal.  Contactless payment changes this.  The card can now be accessed 
without the cardholder’s knowledge or consent. 
The proposed POS authentication solution presented in this paper will protect con-
tactless cards against unauthorised access.  This in turn prevents a range of attacks 
including skimming [5], eavesdropping [7], fraudulent transactions [7], and malicious 
access to secure functionality [6] by off-the-shelf NFC readers and NFC mobile 
phones. The authors acknowledge that the solution does not address man-in-the mid-
dle relay attacks [9]; there is no real answer to this at the moment, but research into 
distance bounding may provide a solution [8]. 
The design of the proposed solution particularly emphasises issues associated with 
introducing new functionality into the globally deployed EMV payment system. New 
cards and new POS terminals are interoperable with existing cards and existing POS 
terminals, thus allowing new and existing cards and terminals to run in parallel. This 
is shown by our prototype implementation, which was implemented without altering 
the EMV transaction protocol sequence. 
The prototype gives a working example of how we can combine ECQV implicit 
certificates with ECDSA signatures to create the PKI that supports POS authentica-
tion.  Furthermore, the 512-bit ECQV and ECDSA provide improved cryptographic 
strength over the current 1984-bit RSA used by EMV.  The shorter keys of ECQV 
and ECDSA enable the new POS authentication data fields to be sent within a single 
256-byte EMV message. 
The “stay alive” key revocation technique described in this paper prevents stolen 
POS terminals or maliciously misused POS terminals from being used on large-scale 
attacks on EMV cards.  The proposed solution does not entirely prevent a rogue POS 
terminal from accessing a small number of cards.  However the revocation technique 
will make such attack economically unattractive to the criminals. 
7 Future work 
Future work will focus on improving the performance of the ECDSA signature verifi-
cation process.  This will include carrying out comparative timing tests between the 
Android prototype and Java Card with a cryptographic co-processor.  We will also 
investigate the technique outlined in [1], which claims to speed up the process by 
40%, in order to improve performance. 
Detailed analysis will be required regarding the number of elliptic curve point ad-
ditions and multiplications needed in each ECDSA signature generation and ECDSA 
signature validation.  This will give a greater understanding of any time difference 
observed between the Java Card and the Android prototype. 
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Appendix 1: POS authentication protocol sequence log 
The following is an extract from the Andorid prototype payment device log file, 
showing the ECDSA verification process (Fig. 1 – 8.1). 
** Select() Command ** 
Select(A0000000071010) 
Response to Select() 
Application ID = A0000000071010 
Application Name = Visa 
PDOL = 9F6604 9F0206 9F1A02 9505 5F2A02 9A03 9C01 9F3704 9F8140 
9F8240 9F8309 9F8440 9F8509 
Nonce = 0102030405060708 (Constant for testing) 
** GetProcessingOptions() ** 
GetProcessingOptions( ED3A2080 00000000000400 0826 0000000000 
0826 131021 00 1AFCD98A  
1CCCB7D1D4EFA5418059527118E296E53FEC0BA0926ECD8753F3758BA81C0FDE
2C52FD23CF55D1FDFFE105A84B365A34A5CED08C84BF1EC8CAA9D080A560649D  
FCA36ACD29343171EA7A8C1F9393843213AF2704B8B522285C8DFE23A687B466
87E461EEE83A2629E0E4D5A95AF0B7E16E594D9C6E46D084713DBBC641EAAE80  
010203041217666666  
776803357640AC4FC4ADEF22379947C6D380E4313D2D2417D75DA26778E5920B
3C0F54383EACA7BF4500B27A3684D0B71B714FC289FA34C526975ACA4D5630D6 
050607071215666666) 
** Getting public key from certificate ** 
Issuer derived Public Key X: 97986087729825723673195818672536728 
594270276851404712149676231740139011657373 
Issuer derived Public Key Y: 95158591496548167422614644321862058 
148177431389807297302562970080780223776567 
** Getting public key from certificate ** 
Terminal derived Public Key X: 826531636244651841116166456501549 
62471717911435572938085165847465994170340624 
Terminal derived Public Key Y: 400906097847140705510567530461021 
38635066213841587075932051885461658493126430 
** Verifying ECDSA ** 
Verifying sig: 1CCCB7D1D4EFA5418059527118E296E53FEC0BA0926ECD875 
3F3758BA81C0FDE2C52FD23CF55D1FDFFE105A84B365A34A5CED08C84BF1EC8C
AA9D080A560649D 
r at verify: 130264652381813556723149742149863721812740633211539 
99611778992039625001537502 
s at verify: 200483939042343687580292443486304943252797902679744 
05052619129105903173788829 
w (hex): 7CC758B14EB3986BF90E243B8C1D5CDF63D0FE6EC229E47F364ED22 
9217188C0  
(w is the inverse of s mod the order n) 
Hash (hex): A344BF51D01AB187E205293800374119531FBEA3ACEAEF9CF1FE 
F911A53230D1 
u1 (hex): 6656DE7E5D9AE5DF9A0293F0B1533D14CBE5F7CD3292D985C0225F 
18C39445C2 
u2 (hex): 0E099626D8D667E7F3E8D8E3BEA3C4730560CB25555ECA5D75BB1B 
8E80C21791456B724EA46D8954585496692604B8A2A4A7C60D73E19902CB81D3
099C77D680 
v: 1302646523818135567231497421498637218127406332115399961177899 
2039625001537502 
r: 1302646523818135567231497421498637218127406332115399961177899 
2039625001537502 
(v and r need to match) 
ECDSA signature Verified: true 
Appendix 2: Glossary 
Acquirer Refers to the bank that holds the destination bank account for the trans-
action, which is typically the bank that issued the POS terminal to the 
merchant.  Also referred to as the “acquiring bank”. 
AAC  Application Authentication Cryptogram - Response code from the card 
that indicates that the transaction has been declined. 
AFL Application File Locator – List of records on the card that contain the 
cryptographic keys required by the POS terminal to validate the trans-
action. 
Aic Acquirer implicit certificate – ECQV implicit certificate used to gener-
ate the acquirer public key during the POS authentication process. 
Aid Acquirer identification data - Data to uniquely identify the acquirer, 
which is encoded into the acquirer’s ECQV implicit certificate (Tic), 
consisting of the acquirer ID, expiry date and a sequence number. 
Apk Acquirer public key – Generated by the card from the Aic. 
ARQC  Authorization Request Cryptogram - Response code from the card that 
indicates that the card wants to complete the transaction online. 
Ask Acquirer private key – Generated by the Certificate Authority and 
stored by the acquirer. 
CA Certificate Authority 
CAind Certificate Authority public key index – An EMV POS terminal sup-
ports multiple CA public keys.  The card indicates the CA public key 
that it supports using the CA public key index. 
CApk Certificate Authority public key. 
CAsk Certificate Authority private key 
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. 
ECQV Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone 
Issuer The bank that issued the card used in the transaction and holds the 
source bank account for the transaction. 
Nonce  An unpredictable number which is used as the challenge sent by the 
card to the POS terminal.  The POS terminal digitally signs the unpre-
dictable number thereby preventing replay attacks. 
PDOL Processing options Data Object List – A flexible list of data fields re-
quested by the card.  The POS returns the requested data fields in the 
GetProcessingOptions() message. 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
POS Point of Sale terminal 
SAM  Secure Access Module – Tamper proof storage module used by POS 
terminals for cryptographic key storage. 
SDAD Signed Dynamic Authentication Data – In the current EMV system the 
card authorised the transaction data by signing the transaction data with 
its private key to produce the SDAD. 
SFI Short File Indicator – The storage on EMV cards is in blocks of 16 
records, each block is referenced by a unique SFI. 
TC Transaction Certificate – Response code from the card that indicates 
that the transaction has been successful. 
Tic Terminal implicit certificate - ECQV implicit certificate used to gener-
ate the terminal public key during the POS authentication process. 
Tid Terminal identification data – Data to uniquely identify the terminal, 
which is encoded into the terminal’s ECQV implicit certificate (Tic), 
consisting of the terminal ID, expiry date and a sequence number. 
Tpk Terminal public key - Generated by the acquirer and stored on the POS 
terminal’s Secure Access Module. 
Tsk Terminal private key - Generated by the acquirer and stored on the POS 
terminal’s Secure Access Module. 
UPN Unpredictable Number – This is a nonce generated by the card and 
included in the SDAD signed transaction data.  This is a separate from 
the nonce used in POS authentication. 
